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Ownership, Governance and US Securities Regulation: The Case for a
“Learning Regulator”
Aviv Pichhadze*

I. OVERVIEW
Mary Schapiro, Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), heads a considerable
enterprise with a projected budget of US$1.3 billion for 2011 (representing an increase of 18%
over 2010) (SEC Press Room 2010) and approximately 3,500 staff (SEC 2010). Schapiro has the
difficult task of carrying out the SEC’s tripartite mission of (i) protecting investors, (ii)
maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and (iii) facilitating capital formation (SEC 2010)
– a mission that is carried out for the implementation the SEC’s vision of becoming and being
the “investor’s advocate” (Schapiro 2009b)
Schapiro took over the helm of the SEC in 2009 – a time when the organization was, and still is,
attempting to reform its approaches to the regulation of the capital markets (Schapiro 2009b).
This period corresponds with the aftermath of the deepest economic shock experienced by the
capital markets since the Great Depression of the 1920s – an event that gave birth to the
formation of the organization (SEC 2010).
While the SEC exhibits a realization that change in its approach is required, the nature of the
strategic change it must undertake vis‐à‐vis regulation is still unfolding and involves the choice
between two alternatives. On the one hand, it can adopt short‐term changes with the hope of
achieving rapid and tangible progress (see, e.g., Imai 1986). On the other hand, it can adopt
longer‐term changes that involve the SEC implementing (i) continuous improvement, reflecting
the need for continuously improving the organization (see, e.g., Stacey 1993), (ii) continuous
learning, reflecting the need for continuously improving – as well as challenging currently
accepted – organizational knowledge (see, e.g., Argyris 1990 ; Senge 1990), and (iii) continuous
adaptation, reflecting adjustment to external changes (see, e.g., Mintzberg and Westley 1992;
Nonaka 1988). In short, the SEC must decide whether it is a problem‐solving organization (i.e.,
one that is adopting short‐term strategies for the purposes of responding to immediate
concerns) or a learning organization (i.e., one that is adopting longer‐term strategies able to
meet near and longer‐term demands). Here, a learning organization is one that is capable of
adaptation and learning.
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Schapiro, it would appear, is cognizant of the need for the SEC to become a learning
organization or a learning regulator and of the dangers associated with adopting short‐term
strategies in addressing the causes and consequences of the recent economic crisis (see, e.g.,
Schapiro 2009a). The question, however, is whether the SEC is, in fact, adaptive (i.e., capable of
responding to the changes of its environment and the environment subject to its regulation) or
exhibiting learning (i.e., able to improve its organizational knowledge).
One should be mindful of the fact that policy situations may involve many problems and issues
that may be tightly interrelated. As a result, in some cases a solution to one issue may, in turn,
require a solution to all the other problems. In other cases, each new solution may create
additional wrinkles that may need to be addressed in the solutions to the other issues. Finally,
very few, if any, problems can be isolated effectively for individual treatment (Mason and
Mitroff 1981).
The complexities of policymaking (i.e., the interwoven nature of issues) are exemplified in the
treatment of public corporate ownership in the US securities regulatory framework – a
framework that is the subject of the SEC’s oversight. The reason stems from the fact that
ownership patterns within a given economy affect many different areas of the regulatory
framework and key governance arrangements (Bebchuk and Hamdani 2009; Kraakman et al.
2004). Consequently, any distortion relating to the treatment of ownership in one area of the
regulatory framework may have implications that transcend into other areas of the system.
It is in the regulatory treatment of corporate ownership that we see evidence of partial
organizational learning and adaptability on the part of the SEC. More particularly, through
examination of (i) the theoretical basis of the proxy rules, in general, and (ii) one of the
strategies proposed by Schapiro for the enhancement of shareholder protection in the context
of the proxy rules in particular, I show that the SEC has come short of evolving into a learning
organization/regulator. The analysis also points to the observation that absent learning and
adaptability, the SEC is capable of, and actually is, introducing into the regulatory framework
what Pichhadze (2010b) referred to as regulatory systemic risk – a risk resulting from the
misalignment between policy initiatives and market realities which affects multiple areas of the
regulatory framework.
The timeliness of the analysis in this article is of relevance as the SEC is currently “reviewing …
whether the U.S. proxy system as a whole operates with the accuracy, reliability, transparency,
accountability, and integrity that shareholders and issuers should rightfully expect.”1

1

Securities and Exchange Commission, Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, 17 CFR Parts 240, 270, 274, and
275 [Release Nos. 34‐62495; IA‐3052; IC‐29340; File No. S7‐14‐10] [“Concept Release”], at 7.
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II. ANALYTICAL BACKGROUND
The SEC was created by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 during the aftermath of the
Great Depression of 1929 to restore public confidence in the public securities markets by
providing investors and markets with reliable information and rules that ensure that investors
are treated fairly and honestly (SEC 2010).
The SEC’s philosophical emphasis on transparency for the sake of promoting investor protection
“is shared by securities regulators around the world, as well as IOSCO [the International
Organization of Securities Commissions] … [which] has been instrumental in advocating and
facilitating transparency throughout the world’s capital markets, through the creation of
numerous standards and principles promoting transparency in key aspects of the securities
markets” (Schapiro 2009c).
One such set of principles or guidelines introduced by IOSCO is called the Principles of Securities
Regulation (Principles). First introduced in 1998, the Principles provide for a general framework
for the regulation of the securities markets and their participants to meet three objectives: (i)
investor protection, (ii) ensuring fair, efficient, and transparent markets, and (iii) the reduction
of systemic risk (IOSCO 2008). To meet these objectives, the Principles note that “the Regulator
should review the particular way in which securities regulation is carried out because the
markets themselves are in a constant state of development and the content of regulation also
must change if it is to facilitate and properly regulate these evolving markets” (IOSCO 2008, 6).
In acknowledging the dynamic and evolving nature of the capital markets, the drafters of the
Principles recognized that regulators need to foster a proactive approach to strategic change.
Stated differently, while the mission/vision of the SEC may remain unaltered, its approach to
attaining such mission/vision must evolve in response to the dynamic nature of the markets if it
is to remain relevant.
To successfully address this need for change, the Principles require, it can be argued, that
regulators perform two tasks: (i) regulators must improve their organizational knowledge by
accumulating new knowledge as well as challenging currently acceptable organizational
knowledge in order for such knowledge to remain relevant and (ii) they must adapt their
approaches to ever changing market realities that are the subject of the regulatory framework.
Both of these requirements, learning and adaptation, are mutually reinforcing and are intended
to lead regulators to becoming learning organizations or learning regulators. That is, regulators
are expected to engage in the process of “creating, acquiring, and transferring knowledge, and
at modifying [their] behavior to reflect new knowledge and insights” (Garvin 1993, 80) and in
detecting and correcting errors (see, e.g., Argyris 1977).
The call for regulators to become learning organizations has both organizational and economic
implications. From an organizational perspective, learning means that the SEC (through its staff)
must decide how to modify its processes to accommodate the changes in the marketplace
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while maintaining (and achieving) its vision of being the investors’ advocate and the tripartite
set of objectives set out by IOSCO. To this end, Senge (1990) argued that the organization must
come to terms with the tension created through the gap between the organization’s vision (i.e.,
“where we want to be”) and reality (i.e., “where we are”).
To achieve this, the organization will need to engage in two types of learning: (i) incremental (or
adaptive) learning, where knowledge is gained in a reactive manner after a problem has
occurred, and (ii) continuous (or generative) learning, where knowledge is sought in a proactive
manner in order to fix processes prior to the occurrence of a problem (Argyris 1977; Senge
1990). Thus, the process of becoming a learning organization entails a conscious organizational
effort on the part of the SEC’s individual members for the achievement of the organizational
vision. As noted by Senge (1994, 48), “every organization is a product of how its members think
and interact.” As a result, the primary leverage for any organizational learning effort lies in
people rather than in policies or budgets.
From an economic perspective, the requirement for the regulator to exhibit adaptation to
market developments translates into the introduction of efficiency into the markets. This was
observed by Williamson (2005), who distinguished between two types of adaptation that work
together to achieve economic efficiency.2 First there is “autonomous adaptation” exhibited by
market actors in response to changes in the markets. In order to promote efficiency in the
market, autonomous adaptation ought to be supplemented by “consciously coordinated
adaptation” to be exhibited by administration (i.e., the regulator). Thus, in the context of
governance, efficiency, according to Williamson, is the product of adaptive capacities of both
markets and hierarchies.
As can be seen from the above, the requirement for the regulator to exhibit adaptation to
changes in its environment means (from both organizational and economics perspectives) that
the regulator needs to proactively engage in the learning process if it is to meet its
organizational vision and objectives. The question to be answered is whether the SEC, through
its actions, rises up to the task.

III. THE PROXY RULES IN THE US: DISTORTIONS, EMBEDDEDNESS, AND
AMPLIFICATION
To examine the question of whether the SEC displays (in practice) adaptability and learning it is
suggested that we examine the treatment of corporate ownership within the regulatory
framework administered by the organization. As noted earlier, the choice of ownership as the
2

While Williamson (2005) appears to be referring to adaptation in the context of the firm, I extend the application
of the concept to cover the capital markets.
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subject of examination is not arbitrary given its broad implications to many areas of the
regulatory system.
Before turning to the examination of whether or not the SEC displays adaptation and learning,
we need to observe the changes that necessitate the organization to foster strategic changes.
Accordingly, I first describe the evolution in public corporate ownership in the US capital
markets in brief. This is followed by an examination of whether the SEC successfully responded
to this evolution in ownership. As the discussion will highlight, the SEC has been ineffective in
achieving learning and, consequently, adaptation vis‐à‐vis the evolution in public corporate
ownership, and heightened the hazard of introducing into the framework regulatory systemic
risk (Pichhadze 2010b).

A. OWNERSHIP – AN EVOLUTIONARY TREND
In the US, as the markets matured and grew in complexity, they have been evolving towards
the Market Oriented Blockholder Model (MOBM). According to Pichhadze (2010a), the MOBM
is a hybrid ownership structure featuring a blockholder mode of ownership3 that works with
market mechanism (e.g., takeovers).
This claim appears to contradict the general wisdom in the corporate governance literature,
which teaches that the ownership pattern in the US is properly understood as dispersed.
Nevertheless, an evolutionary analysis reveals that the American equity markets have gone
through three stages of development, leading to the trend towards the MOBM (Pichhadze
2010a). A similar three‐stage development has also been observed in the context of the UK
(Gower and Davies 2003).
1. Stage 1 – Concentrated Ownership
During the early stages of the capital markets, ownership was concentrated in the hands of
industrial elites and active investors (Jensen 1989: 65; Marshall 1890). These active investors
defined American approaches to investment oversight (Pound 1992). The prevailing mode of
corporate ownership utilized the venture capital model (Roe 1997), which worked with market
mechanisms such as takeovers and mergers (Marshall 1890). Thus, we see that, during these
early days of the US capital, markets market participants were able to marry a concentrated
mode of ownership with market mechanisms such as takeover activity.
3

The spectrum of public firm ownership can be divided into three clusters: (i) concentrated ownership (ownership
concentration ≥ 50.1%); (ii) blockholder ownership (5% ≤ ownership concentration ≥ 50%); and (iii) dispersed
ownership (ownership concentration < 5%). The choice of the 5% threshold is based on the disclosure filing
requirements under s. 13(d), Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. Ch. 2B, that requires, inter alia,
disclosure of beneficial ownership of 5% or more by any person of the outstanding shares of a firm’s securities
subject to Securities and Exchange Act. While the above are used as a general guide, these lines of demarcation
are fluid and are subject to change from one firm to another based on factors such as size of the firm and
shareholdings of individual investors.
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2. Stage 2 – Limited Fragmentation of Ownership
During the early decades of the 20th century, observers noted the increased fragmentation in
the ownership of America’s largest firms as corporations sought to raise capital from a growing
pool of investors (see, e.g., Carver 1925). This observation is largely associated with Berle and
Means (1932), who, according to Tsuk (2005), were principally concerned with the power of
large corporations. Large firms accounted for approximately 23% of the public firms in the Berle
and Means study. The remaining 77% displayed blockholder ownership patterns (Berle and
Means 1932, 27). As such, ownership during this period can be said to be “dispersed” to the
extent that one confines the observation to large firms.
Roe (1997, 8) noted that the corporate ownership model at the turn of the 20th century (i.e.,
the venture capital model) was not adopted as the preferred ownership model for corporate
America as a result of populist laws and interest group politics, which “played a key role in
fragmenting stock ownership beyond what was required” [emphasis added].
3. Stage 3 – Towards the MOBM
Fragmentation of corporate ownership (in large firms in particular) gave rise to two parallel
market developments. The first development is the growth of institutional investors (IIs). The
second development is the role of active investment as monitors of corporate managers. Both
developments paved the way towards the MOBM and represent Williamson’s (2005)
autonomous adaptation (Pichhadze 2010b). According to Williamson (2005, 4), “adaptation is
the central problem of economic organization. Hayek focused on the adaptations of economic
actors who adjust spontaneously to changes in the market. ... the marvel of the market resides
in ‘how little the individual participants need to know to be able to take the right actions’”
[emphasis added]. Thus, market actors are not required to have a conscious knowledge of the
process. Let us consider each development in brief.
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS – GROWTH AND DISTORTION
Throughout the second half of the 20th century, the ownership of public corporate equity
began to re‐concentrate into the hands of IIs; thereby institutionalizing the American securities
markets (Cohen 1969). The institutionalization of the markets was encouraged by the US
government, in part, as a response to changing socio‐economic demands and needs (Naess
1964), and the process continues to the present day. The transformation in equity ownership
from industrial capitalism to financial capitalism paved the way for the movement towards the
MOBM, which features IIs as blockholders.
The findings of Brancato and Rabimov (2008) illustrate the extent of the institutionalization in
the US markets. For example, they show that total institutional assets increased from $2.7
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trillion in 1980 to $27.1 trillion in 2006. Total institutional holdings increased from $8.7 billion in
1950 (or 6.1% of total equity markets) to $12.9 trillion in 2006 (or 66.3% of total equity
markets). In addition, IIs have increased their holdings in America’s 1000 largest firms from
46.6% in 1987 to 76.4% in 2007.
In relation to America’s 25 largest corporations (ranked by market capitalization as of
December 31, 2007), Brancato and Rabimov (2008) observed that these firms have a total
institutional average holding ranging from a low of 52.9% in Exxon Mobil to a high of 85.4% in
AIG. Of these 25 firms, 15 had at least on blockholder (i.e., investor owning 5% or more of the
firm’s outstanding shares). This list of 15 firms also includes AT&T, which Berle and Means
(1932) used as their example of a dispersed giant corporation – indicating the change in the
character of ownership in America’s largest firms since Berle and Means published their widely
cited study. In six of the largest 25 firms the largest investor held near blockholder levels (i.e., in
the 4‐5% range).
No less insightful is the observation made by others that “while there are many institutional
investors, holdings are, in fact, concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of the
very largest institutional investors. For example, in the USA, the 100 largest fiduciary
institutions hold fully 52 per cent of all publicly held equity” [emphasis in the original] (Hawley
and Williams 2007, 415). Hence, not only is equity ownership concentrated in the hands of IIs,
ownership is further concentrated within this class of investors.
Despite the fact that IIs experienced growth both in size and in influence (economic and
political), Pichhadze (2010a, 71‐72) turns our attention to an interesting peculiarity in the
literature. The working hypothesis in the literature treats the US as a diffused ownership
economy. An example of the working hypothesis can be found in the following statement by
Bebchuk and Roe (1999, 133): “[a]t present, publicly traded firms in the United States and the
United Kingdom commonly have dispersed ownership.” This working hypothesis, in turn,
affected, as we shall see below, the views and understanding of regulators and policymakers
who assume that the ownership pattern in the typical American public firm is diffused.
ACTIVE INVESTING AS OWNERSHIP GAP‐FILLING
The fragmentation in public corporate ownership (in large firms especially) provided, it has
been argued, for an environment for active investors to, inter alia, fulfill a governance function
by filling the ownership gap (Pound 1992). Here, governance function means the monitoring of
corporate managers.
According to this view, when the ownership of a public firm becomes too fragmented such that
(i) the firm experiences a reduction in the effective monitoring of the firm’s management, and
(ii) such reduced monitoring results in the introduction of inefficiencies to the firm, then (iii)
market mechanisms, such as takeover activity, introduce into the firm improved monitoring and
enhanced efficiency by, among other things, concentrating, at least temporarily, the ownership
of the firm (Pichhadze 2010b).
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According to Pound (1992) this process is not an episodic event but, rather, a recurring one.
More specifically, it appears to be a cyclical event that is part of the operation of the capital
markets and is driven by market forces with the intention of eliminating inefficiencies in the
marketplace and the firms operating within it. This is achieved through the provision of
enhanced monitoring of listed firms while maintaining liquidity in the markets. Consequently,
Pound (1992, 6) observed, “[t]he ultimate result is never revolution, but rather evolution.”
This evolutionary process appears to be one that splices blockholder components onto a
market system in an attempt of achieving a governance structure that meets two market
needs: (i) the need for improved monitoring of corporate management (associated with
concentrated ownership) and (ii) the need to have liquid and efficient capital markets
(associated with dispersed ownership). Under the traditional analysis in the literature these
market needs are viewed as substitutes (Coffee 1999). Consequently, meeting these needs
invariably involves the choice between tradeoffs that result from the choice of adopting one
type of ownership structure (i.e., dispersed or concentrated) over the other. Under the
conditions giving rise to the MOBM, however, these tradeoffs are transformed into
complements.
In addition to transforming substitutes into complements, given that a feature of the model is
the presence of a blockholder, the observation of the trend towards the MOBM may point to
the proposition that market forces are attempting to reduce the sub‐optimality associated with
diffused ownership (such sub‐optimality was suggested by Bebchuk and Zingales 2000).
Accordingly, market forces can be said to, in effect, be attempting to arrive at an ownership
equilibrium that affords both liquidity and monitoring, as well as structural optimality.
Market mechanisms assist in the promotion of this equilibrium and its maintenance over time.
Maintenance is essential since the ownership equilibrium, once achieved, does not remain in a
static state. Rather, it is a dynamic process that exhibits deviations from, and restoration to, the
equilibrium state. In this dynamic process, market mechanisms such as corporate control
transactions have an important role in restoring the equilibrium state when deviations from the
equilibrium state occur.
In addition to transforming substitutes into complements, the MOBM appears to represent a
socially optimal ownership structure, where social optimality refers to the idea that the
shareholders’ representatives serve the shareholders’ interest (Grossman and Hart 1980).
According to Grossman and Hart (1980), social optimality in the context of the corporation can
be achieved in two ways (both of which are features of the MOBM). One way of ensuring that
social welfare is met is through the monitoring of managers by shareholders. The problem,
according to Grossman and Hart (1980), is that absent anyone owning sufficient stakes in the
corporation, monitoring is left to market‐mechanisms such as takeovers. Yet, as the discussion
in this article has shown, market forces and socio‐economic realities created a venue for the
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promotion of social optimality in the corporation. They have paved the way for the re‐
concentration of equity ownership into the hands of IIs. These shareholders (i) participate in the
corporate control arena (both independently and in concert with active investors) and (ii) have
sufficient stake in the corporation and, therefore, an interest in monitoring corporate
managers. Thus, markets forces appear to be reducing the costs associated with monitoring via
voice (Deakin et al. 2006, 160).
Active investors, IIs, and the takeover structures that their partnership produce to acquire
control in companies (i.e., private equity and leveraged buyout funds) appear, at a first glance,
to be strange bedfellows. This is because active investors are said to have a negative image with
both the public and the politicians (JACF 2006; Pound 1992; Roe 1997). On the other hand, IIs (i)
enjoy, generally, the favor of the public, (ii) are viewed as part of the democratization of the
public firm – as they are viewed as being the agents for the diffusion of the ownership of the
public firm (Carver 1925; Hansmann and Kraakman 2004), and (iii) are viewed as the champions
of shareholder rights and improved corporate citizenship (Hansmann and Kraakman 2004).
Despite this curious marriage between IIs and active investors, Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001,
132) observed that the institutionalization of the American equity markets played a key role in
the emergence of the takeover wave in the 1980s. Thus, the need for (i) increased returns on
investment and (ii) liquidity for their equity holdings drives IIs to PE; whereas the need for large
pools of capital drives PE to IIs.
The growth of IIs in the US has cemented the gravitation towards the MOBM – or the third
stage of development in ownership patterns in the US. The MOBM can be thought of as
representing the result of the need of market forces to create an environment that facilitates
enhanced monitoring of corporate managers, while ensuring liquid and efficient markets. In so
doing, market forces have been facilitating the development of a variant of the blockholder
model – a blockholder model that utilizes market mechanisms. This stands in contrast to other
blockholder models discussed in the literature, which, generally, are said to exhibit a weak
market for corporate control (see, e.g., Bebchuk and Hamdani 2009).

B. OWNERSHIP AND THE FAILURE TO LEARN AND ADAPT
As noted earlier, IOSCO, the international standard setting organization for securities
regulators, as well as economic and organizational theories suggest that the SEC, as the
principal securities regulator in the US, take note of the evolutionary developments just
described vis‐à‐vis ownership in the US and adapt its regulatory approaches accordingly.
Using the proxy rules in the US, the discussion will show that the SEC has failed in these tasks.
More particularly, it is suggested that the SEC has internalized, embedded, and amplified two
distortions in relation to ownership. First, through a misreading of Berle and Means (1932), the
SEC has introduced a distortion into the regulatory framework vis‐à‐vis the appropriate tension
to be resolved via regulations. This distortion became embedded and amplified with the growth
of IIs – the second source of distortions within the regulatory framework.
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1. Introduction of a Distortion
The proxy rules in the US are found in s. 14 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Sargent
and Honabach (2009) observed that the proxy rules “derive directly from the Berle‐Means
description of the public corporation and the belief that managerialism represented a threat to
public shareholders.” Briefly stated, Berle and Means (1932) observed that by the early 1930s
the wealth of corporate America was concentrated in the hands of that nation’s largest
corporations, and that these corporations have experienced a separation of ownership from
control. Two observations were derived from this study in the literature and, consequently,
adopted by regulatory circles. One relates to the ownership pattern in large firms. The other
relates to the balance of powers within the corporation.
With respect to ownership patterns, Berle and Means noted that the largest firms in the US at
the time displayed an atomistic pattern of ownership. Large firms in their study accounted for
approximately 23% of the total listed firms. This observation about a fraction of the firms in the
public markets, however, was generalized and internalized in the literature to encompass all of
the firms in these markets. More importantly, the generalization became “Berle and Means
recognized what was to become the dominant corporate paradigm of 20th‐century American
capitalism” (Edwards and Hubbard 2000, 92). With respect to the balance of power within
these corporations, Berle and Means noted that the atomistic shareholders were under the
influence of incumbent managers. Thus, the rules are premised on the view that the typical
American public firm is properly characterized as having diffused ownership and, consequently,
shareholders require protection from incumbent managers.
Since the introduction of the proxy rules in the 1930s, the foundation of the proxy rules has
been based on this generalized (and misleading) corporate paradigm. The problem with the
proxy rules being based on the Berle‐Means Corporation rests in the failure of the regulator to
appreciate the fact that the Berle‐Means Corporation represented only a fraction of the firms
when the rules were initially introduced in 1934 – a fraction which accounted for only 23% of
the listed firms in the Berle and Means study. As such, the proxy rules focused on addressing
the needs of shareholders in this small segment of the market. The remaining 77% of the firms
that displayed blockholder types of ownership patterns, it would appear, were overlooked (and
their needs were under‐addressed) by policymakers.
This distorted view of the ownership patterns in the US had policy implications. First, regulators
adopted Berle and Mean’s “unimportance” argument vis‐à‐vis non‐large firms. Specifically,
Berle and Means argued that the non‐large firms in their study (or 77% of the listed firms) were
unimportant given that they did not command any significant market power when compared to
the large firms in their study (or 23% of the listed firms) (Berle and Means 1932, 28). Second, by
importing this bias into the regulatory framework, regulators created regulatory gaps and
introduced imbalance into the regulatory framework (Pichhadze 2010b).
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The imbalance results from the regulator’s primary focus on protecting shareholders from
potential abuses by management (i.e., shareholder‐manager type tension), which is associated
with 23% of the firms in the Berle and Means study. Were regulators to design a regulatory
framework that addresses the majority of the firms in the US capital markets, the attention of
the regulatory framework would have been on protecting minority shareholders from potential
abuses by blockholders (i.e., the minority shareholder‐blockholder type tension) in addition to
addressing the shareholder‐management tension.
2. Embedding and Amplifying the Distortion
The above imbalance became embedded in the regulatory framework over time. This can be
seen, for example, from one of Schapiro’s recent initiatives designed to increase shareholder
protection. Recently, the SEC adopted changes to the federal proxy rules by introducing a new
rule called Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Rule).4 The Rule is designed to
facilitate the rights of shareholders (either individually or as a shareholder group) to nominate
directors to corporate boards by allowing shareholders to have their nominees included in the
proxy materials.5
The difficulty raised by the Rule is that it is premised on the understanding that the US is
characterized by diffused ownership and that the prevailing mode of corporate ownership is
characterized by the Berle‐Means Corporation. This view is supported by (and may be the
product of) academic thinking that propagates Berle and Means’ “unimportance” argument vis‐
à‐vis non‐large firms. As some commentators have argued, for example, “[t]he largest
companies are very much giants among their corporate brethren. As a result, a separation
between ownership and control remains an appropriate reference point” (Cheffins and Bank
2009, 52). Yet, this view overlooks the real tension to be resolved via legislation – the minority
shareholder‐blockholder type tension (Pichhadze 2010b).
Consequently, after nearly eight decades since the Berle and Means study, the SEC continues to
base the proxy rules on the erroneous understanding that ownership in the US markets is
diffused despite the fact that the institutionalization of these markets is well documented in the
literature and despite awareness (and, at times, concern) by the SEC of the process.6 Thus, it
can be argued that, not only has the SEC failed in learning and adaptability, it further amplified
distortions introduced into the legislative scheme in 1934 by failing to do so.7
4

17 CFR Parts 200, 232, 240 and 249.

5

The eligibility criteria to nominating directors include, among other things, such things as meeting an ownership
threshold (either individually or in aggregate) of at least 3% and a holding period of at least three years
continuously prior to the nomination.
6

Pichhadze (2010a), for example, cites a number of studies commissioned by the SEC during the 1960s and 1970s
to study the implications of the institutionalization of the US capital markets.
7

While the Concept Release serves to indicate adaptability by the SEC to market realities, this adaptability is only
partial given that it refers to the Rule in positive terms and, as such, it adopts the theoretical basis of the proxy
rules as being premised on the Berle Means Corporation.
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Amplification, in the context of the Rule, results from the fact that the threshold requirements
are such that only a select group of shareholders can meet the requirements. This group
consists mainly of IIs. Thus, that the overall effect of the Rule appears to be the empowerment
of this class of shareholders. Given that IIs are generally treated in the literature as vehicles for
the diffusion of public ownership (see, e.g., Carver 1925; Hansmann and Kraakman 2004), there
is little surprise that the regulator is not careful in empowering this group of investors by
ignoring evidence that fiduciaries are the emerging blockholders in the markets.
However, were the SEC to engage in the learning and adaptation processes, which include the
reassessment of existing knowledge in light of new evidence, it is not certain that Rule would
have come into existence in its present form. This is because the Rule magnifies the minority
shareholder‐blockholder type tension due to the nature of the blockholder (Pichhadze 2010b).
For example, while some observers assume that IIs have interests that are homogeneous with
other shareholders (see, e.g., Hansmann and Kraakman 2004), others note that shareholders
are in fact a heterogeneous group with different interests (see, e.g., Anabtawi 2005‐2006;
Anabtawi and Stout 2008). As such, regulatory initiatives that may be suited for financial
blockholders may not necessarily address the concerns of smaller shareholders.
Observing heterogeneity within the shareholder body is important due to the nature of the
SEC’s business – regulation. As such, the SEC is subject to influences from different groups that
seek to advance their group specific interests – interests that may not be shared by other
members of the capital markets. In the context of the proxy rules, it has been observed that
since the 1980s IIs have sought to amend the proxy rules in several ways so as to gain greater
influence on corporate decision making, including the ability to influence the election of
corporate boards (Sargent and Honabach 2009).
Given that the Rule will effectively allow IIs greater influence on corporate decision making, it is
not surprising that IIs supported the introduction of the Rule while it was in the proposal stages
(Lynch 2009). This, however, may potentially detract from the sought after aim of protecting
outside investors. As Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009, 1295) commented in the context of
concentrated ownership, “giving the majority shareholders more power vis‐à‐vis the board
would operate to weaken – not enhance – the protection of outside investors.”

IV. THE RISK OF FAILING TO BECOME A LEARNING REGULATOR
To this point in the article, the discussion highlighted the SEC’s failure to exhibit learning and
adaptability in relation to theoretical foundation of the proxy rules that were introduced in
1934 and in relation to the evolving nature of public corporate ownership in the US. In addition
to the organizational and economic implications discussed above, this failure at becoming a
learning organization also means that the SEC may be failing in meeting one of the objectives
set out by IOSCO identified above – the reduction of systemic risk. The type of systemic risk
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referred to here is regulatory systemic risk – a risk resulting from the misalignment between
policy initiatives and market realities which affects multiple areas of the regulatory framework
(Pichhadze 2010b).
To see how we arrive at this observation we, first, need to consider what is meant by systemic
risk. In the context of the SEC’s business – the administration of the regulatory framework for
the securities markets – we can treat the regulatory framework as a system or as an aggregate
of policies and regulations forming a connected or complex whole. Viewed in this way, systemic
risk is a problem that pertains to the system (i.e., the regulatory framework).
Based on such an understanding, regulatory systemic risk can arise in cases where (i) policy
initiatives do not align with market realities such that regulatory gaps are created, (ii) these
gaps go unnoticed and become embedded in the regulatory framework, and (iii) the reach of
the distortion(s) extends to multiple areas of the regulatory framework. That is, imbalances of a
long‐term nature which are systemic to the regulatory framework and result in regulatory
systemic risk.
It would appear that Schapiro is cognizant of the possibility of introducing regulatory systemic
risk into the regulatory framework of the securities market. Recently, Schapiro (2009a)
distinguished between two types of systemic risk: (i) near‐term systemic risk and (ii) long‐term
systemic risk. Near‐term systemic risk results from seizures or cascading failures that threaten
the stability of the financial markets. Factors that may create near‐term systematic risk include,
for example, catastrophic failure of major players (in the banking sector) and the inability to
process or validate trades (in the securities industry). Longer‐term systemic risk results from the
unintentional bias towards larger institutions at the expense of smaller participants.
According to Schapiro (2009a), there is a causal relationship between these two types of risk
given the hazard that in attempting to protect the financial system from near‐term seizures,
regulators can inadvertently introduce long‐term imbalances into the regulatory system. To
avoid such outcome, Schapiro suggests that we need to, among other things, address structural
imbalances that facilitate the development of systemic risk by closing gaps in regulations.
Stated differently, Schapiro appears to suggest that the regulator must engage in observation,
learning, and adaptability – or be a learning regulator – in order to avoid the hazard of
introducing systemic risk into the regulatory framework.
Yet, while Schapiro displays awareness of the need for becoming a learning regulator, the
discussion in this article has shown that not only has the SEC failed in observing the distortion
vis‐à‐vis ownership in the context of the proxy rules, Schapiro’s own initiative (i.e., the Rule)
points to lack of learning and adaptability to evolutionary trends in corporate ownership. This
failure leads, in turn, to the creation of a new type of systemic risk – regulatory systemic risk.
This risk, which arises from the introduction of imbalances into the regulatory framework via
legislation that does not align with market realities, affects (or at least has the potential to)
more than one area of the regulatory framework and as such impact the stability of the
regulatory framework.
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Regulatory systemic risk is illustrated by the treatment of ownership in the regulatory
framework. While the discussion in this article focused on one aspect of the regulatory system,
proxy rules, and the distortions embedded within it, a student of the area will realize that the
impact of the distortion transcends into other areas of the framework. This is because
ownership affects such matters as (i) takeovers and defensive measures adopted by firms to
thwart such activity, (ii) conflict of interest rules and related party rules, (iii) significant
corporate action and disclosure rules, and (iv) board independence (see, e.g., Bebchuk and
Hamdani 2009; Kraakman et al. 2004). As such the distortion becomes systemic.

V. CONCLUSION
Schapiro’s task of restoring the public’s confidence in the capital markets in the post‐2007
market crash and carrying out the SEC’s vision of being the investors’ advocate is an important
one. Yet, to meet the challenges presented by dynamic markets, vision alone is insufficient. To
bridge the gaps between “where we want to be” (i.e., a regulatory framework that provides for
(i) investor protection, (ii) fair and efficient capital markets, and (iii) reduces the potential of
systemic risk) and “where we are” (i.e., a regulatory framework that contains embedded
imbalances that result in regulatory systemic risk), requires "an accurate picture of current
reality [which] is just as important as a compelling picture of a desired future” (Senge 1990: 9).
As the discussion has shown, it is questionable whether the SEC is on track to bridging this gap.
This failure to become a learning regulator may also have industry implications, where industry
means different securities regulators from different economies who are attempting to compete
for domestic and foreign capital for the benefit of their respective markets. Some argue that
competition between policymakers can lead to a “race to the bottom” (resulting in lower grade
regulation for the sake of attracting capital into an economy) and “regulatory arbitrage”
(resulting from firms selecting jurisdictions with lower regulatory barriers to raise capital). It is
suggested, however, that the need for regulators to become learning regulators should result in
a “race to the top” (resulting from regulators competing to offer a regulatory framework that
offers minimal imbalances). Such a race to the top would mean that regulators will be able to
offer a regulatory framework that is more conducive to the promotion of (i) investor protection,
(ii) fair and efficient capital markets, and (iii) reduced systemic risk (including regulatory
systemic risk) at both the domestic and global levels of the financial system.
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